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Abstract
So far, little work has been done on directly estimating differences of wage gaps. Stud-
ies estimating pay differentials, generally compare them across different subsamples. This
comparison does not allow to conduct any inference or, in the case of decompositions, to
confront the respective decomposition components across subsamples. We propose an exten-
sion of an Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition based on the omitted variable bias formula to
directly estimate the change in pay gaps across subsamples. The method proposed can be
made robust to the index-number problem of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
and to the indeterminacy problem of the intercept-shift approach. Using Italian micro data,
we estimate the difference in the gender pay gap across time (2005 and 2014). By applying
our proposed decomposition, we find that the convergence of the gender pay gap over time
is only driven by the catching-up of women in terms of observable characteristics, while the
impact of anti-discrimination legislation is found to be negligible.
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1 Introduction
Gender differentials in the labor market have obtained much attention from policy makers and
researchers leading to the implementation of equal-pay legislation and the promotion of equal
opportunities. Even though equal-pay legislation and equal opportunities have been promoted
in Western industrialized countries for several decades, differences in pay between men and
women persist (see for example Blau and Kahn, 1992, 2006; Goldin, 2014; Blau and Kahn,
2016). For example, in the European Union in 2014, women earned on average 16.7% less than
men (Eurostat, 2017).
Typically, different Gender Pay Gaps (GPGs) are found across time. In particular, declin-
ing GPGs are observed with slower convergence in recent decades (see Blau and Kahn, 2006;
England, 2006). The main reasons for the decline of the GPG over time are found to be the
catching-up of women in terms of education and labour market experience (Goldin, 2006), tech-
nical development (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010), changes in attitudes towards women in the
labor market, less occupational segregation (Cotter, 2004; England, 2006; Mandel and Semyonov,
2014) and anti-discrimination laws (Fortin, 2015). Research has shown that the unexplained or
coefficients effect of the GPG is reduced subsequently over time (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov,
2014). Differences in pay are revealed also across sectors and especially between the public and
the private sector. The Public-Private Sector Wage Gap (PPWG) is found to differ significantly
for men and women (Melly, 2005; Lucifora and Meurs, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007). In fact,
the difference in pay by gender is found to be smaller in the public compared to the private
sector (see for example Melly, 2005; Arulampalam et al., 2007). Regardless of gender, pay levels
in the public sector are on average higher than in the private sector (Lucifora and Meurs, 2006).
The public sector is generally the preferred sector of women due to its fairer recruitment, selection
criteria and remuneration as well as better implementation of anti-discrimination laws (Gornick
and Jacobs, 1998; Grimshaw, 2000).
However, studies examining changes in the wage gap over time and between groups do
not directly estimate the difference of the GPG in year t and year t + 1 (or the wage gap by
sector for men and women for instance), but rather compare the results of the pay gaps in the
corresponding subsamples ex post (e.g. Christofides and Michael, 2013; Mandel and Semyonov,
2014). Studies estimating the difference of the pay gaps in different subsamples, often do not even
provide standard errors for the decomposition. Hence, it is not possible to conduct statistical
inference (Mandel and Semyonov, 2014; Bar et al., 2015). Indeed, this does not allow to draw
conclusions on which of the two wage gaps is more statistically significant, i.e. whether the
difference between the two pay gaps under investigation is statistically significantly different
from zero. Additionally, the conclusion about drivers of the change of pay gaps between groups
may be different, when estimated directly compared to analyzing results estimated in different
subsamples. The reason is that it is not possible to draw direct inference of the difference of
the respective components in the latter case. Moreover, the standard method, i.e. ex-post
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comparison of the decomposition results, does not allow to catch time- (or sector-) and gender-
specific effects that may exist simultaneously, i.e. interactions across gender and time or sector
and gender (in the case of the GPG over time and the PPWG by gender, respectively). We
slightly extend the method proposed by Gelbach (2016) that is based on the Omitted Variable
Bias (OVB) formula to estimate directly the difference between two wage gaps. We are then able
to draw inference on the changes of the pay gap by groups across subsamples and to compare
the various contributors directly, i.e. we can test whether there has been a significant change
of the explained or unexplained part of the gap. Moreover, we can draw conclusions on the
relevance of interaction effects across subsamples and groups. The standard method in applied
labor economics, when it comes to pay gaps between groups is the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder
(1973) decomposition method (Fortin et al., 2011). The approach, however, suffers from non-
invariance with respect to categorical variables and the index-number problem. The intercept-
shift approach attempts to solve the latter but suffers, in particular, from the indeterminacy
problem (Lee, 2015). We extend our proposed method based on the OVB formula and show
that it can be made robust to the above mentioned problems.
We apply our model to two cases. First, we examine the evolution of the GPG over ten years,
from 2005 to 2014 in Italy. Second, we analyze the PPWG between men and women in 2014
in Italy. We analyze each case with the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method and
then repeat the examination with our proposed extension of the Gelbach decomposition. We
expect to find a statistically significant change in differences in observable characteristics (such as
educational attainment, labor market presence as well as job-, industry- or occupational-specific
characteristics) by gender over time as well as a statistically significant change in differences in
coefficients to these characteristics between men and women over time. In fact, the latter may
indicate the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policies. For the second empirical application,
the PPWG by gender, we expect, to find in line with the literature larger pay gaps for women
between the public and the private sector than for men. Additionally, we expect to find a larger
effect of the unexplained component in the PPWG for women; while differences in endowments
may be the main driver of the pay differential for men, they may not explain equally the difference
in the PPWG for women.
For the first case, the findings of the study reveal interesting differences in results when
applying our proposed estimation methodology compared to the ‘standard’ approach.1 Changes
in gender differences of observable characteristics are found to be the only statistically significant
driving force of the convergence of the GPG in the last decade in Italy. On the contrary, by
comparing the different components of the GPGs following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973),
differences in returns to observable characteristics, often referred to as the unexplained part of
the GPG, seem to play a role in closing the gap over the last decade in Italy. In the second
case, we can confirm the conclusions drawn from the estimation in the respective subsamples;
1i.e. the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and ex-post comparison of the decomposition results.
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the higher PPWG for women than for men is due to both differences in the explained and
unexplained component.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition. In Section 3, we outline the method by Gelbach (2016) as well as our proposed
modification. Similarly, we discuss problems of the standard approach and show the robustness
of our method to these problems. Next, in Section 4, we empirically apply the method proposed
to the GPG over time as well as to the PPWG by gender and discuss the results obtained.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Standard Estimation Strategy
The standard methodology to decompose pay differentials between two groups is the Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition. The methodology estimates Mincer-type wage regres-
sions separately for a specific group (e.g. men or women, the public or the private sector) and
then decomposes the wage differential in different components. We use the three-fold Oaxaca-
Blinder approach and thus decompose the pay gap in three components; endowments, coefficients
and interactions:2
ln(w0)− ln(w1) = αˆ0 + X¯0βˆ0 − αˆ1 − X¯1βˆ1
= (X¯0 − X¯1)βˆ1 + (αˆ0 − αˆ1) + X¯1(βˆ0 − βˆ1)
+ (X¯0 − X¯1)(βˆ0 − βˆ1)
where ln(wG) is the logarithmic hourly wage of group G evaluated at the mean, αˆG is the in-
tercept of group G and X¯ ′G and βˆG are K × 1 vectors of average characteristics and estimated
coefficients for G ∈ {0, 1}. The first term is the effect due to differences in observable charac-
teristics. As different observed characteristics are expected to have different effects on earnings,
the difference in observable characteristics is also referred to as the explained component, the
quantity or endowments effect of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The second term is due
to differences in the starting point, i.e. differences in the intercept. The third term is the effect
due to differences in returns on the same set of observable characteristics. This component is
generally referred to as the unexplained part, price or coefficients effect of the gap. Differences
in the intercept are attributed to the coefficients component. In the case of the GPG, if the
2An alternative to the three-fold decomposition outlined here is the standard two-fold decomposition that
decomposes the wage differential in an explained and an unexplained part;
ln(w0)− ln(w1) = αˆ0 + X¯0βˆ0 − αˆ1 − X¯1βˆ1
= (X¯0 − X¯1)βˆ0 + (αˆ0 − αˆ1) + X¯1(βˆ0 − βˆ1)
We focus here on the three-fold decomposition, as we argue that interaction effects may be important when
considering differences across pay gaps.
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differential is mainly due to the price effect, this may indicate the presence of gender discrimi-
nation.3 The last term is the so-called interaction term. The intuition behind is that differences
in endowments and coefficients may exist simultaneously between groups (Jann, 2008).
3 Econometric Model
We propose a slight modification of the decomposition method by Gelbach (2016). The Gelbach-
approach decomposes cross-specification differences in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates
of the group-dummy coefficient from the wage model in a path-independent way yielding a
Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition. By using the OVB formula, the decomposition is consis-
tently estimated conditional on all covariates used in the regression. This method, similar to
the standard estimation approach outlined in Section 2, decomposes the sample mean difference
in wages between different groups in an explained and an unexplained part (see Gelbach, 2016,
for details).
3.1 Extension of Gelbach (2016)
The model outlined in the following allows not only to obtain information on whether the pay
gap has decreased in a statistically significant way on aggregate but also to testify what are the
main contributors to the change (if any) of the differential. Consider the case, when we estimate
the wage equation separately by G (group) and Y (data wave or a group different from G, i.e.
Y 6= G) for individual i, with i = 1, 2, . . . N :
ln(wiGY ) = αGY +XiGY βGY + iGY (1)
with G ∈ {0, 1}, Y ∈ {A,B}; and where ln(wiGY ) is individual i’s logarithmic wage of G in Y ,
αGY is a constant, XiGY is a 1 × K vector of exogenous regressors, βGY is the corresponding
K × 1 vector of coefficients and iGY is the error term.4 When we evaluate the estimation at
the mean given the OLS property that OLS estimates must go through the mean of the data,
equation (1) becomes:
ln(wGY ) = αˆGY + x¯GY βˆGY (2)
3However, as pointed out by Blau and Kahn (2006), the unexplained portion of the GPG may include effects
of unobserved characteristics such as individual productivity, motivation or educational quality.
4In the first empirical application in Section 4, we set the index G equal to gender and the index Y
equal to different years or waves of the data set. Consequently, in case 1 of the empirical implementation,
we have for G ∈ {0, 1}; 0 = male and 1 = female and for Y ∈ {A,B}; A = starting period or 2005
and B = ending period or 2014. In the second empirical example shown in Section 4, group G represents
different sectors and Y men or women. Thus, in case 2 of the empirical part, we have for G ∈ {0, 1};
0 = public-sector employment and 1 = private sector employment and for Y ∈ {A,B}; A = female and B = male.
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where αˆGY is the constant, x¯GY is the 1×K row vector of sample means of observable charac-
teristics in X:
x¯GY =
[
x¯k1, x¯k2, . . . , x¯K
]
and βˆGY is the corresponding K × 1 vector of parameter estimates. Four different pairs of
(G, Y ) and thus four regressions of equation (2) are possible; (0, A), (0, B), (1, A), (1, B). The
corresponding regressions between G and Y are conducted by assuming the same set of regressors
for all four cases.
Now, consider estimating the joint model. The first group index G is added to the regression
as a dummy variable Gi among the controls on the right-hand side. Analogously, the second
group index Y is transformed in a dummy variable Yi controlling for group Y membership. The
indicator variable takes value one, if the observation corresponds to A and takes value zero, if we
observe B.5 As in Gelbach (2016), we distinguish between two sets of regressors, Xi1 and Xi2,
where the set of regressors Xi1, with dimension 1×4, is the base specification containing only (for
each observation i) a constant, an interaction term between the group dummies, GiYi, as well
as the dummies, Gi and Yi, separately. The interaction of the dummies for group membership
Gi and Yi are contained in GiYi. The base model is therefore defined as follows:
ln(wiGY ) = Xi1α
base + baseiGY
ln(wiGY ) = α
base
0 +GiYiα
base
1 +Giα
base
2 + Yiα
base
3 + 
base
iGY (3)
where αbase0 is the constant and α
base
1 , α
base
2 , α
base
3 are the corresponding coefficients contained in
the 4×1 column vector αbase, baseiGY is the corresponding error term. The second set of regressors,
Xi2, has dimension 1 × 4K and contains the 1 ×K vector of explanatory variables Xi as well
as the interactions of Xi with Gi, Yi and GiYi, respectively. The set of regressors Xi2 will be
considered later as omitted variables in order to obtain a decomposition of the change of the
wage gap between Gi across Yi. The full model is then defined as:
ln(wiGY ) = Xi1α
full +Xi2β + 
full
iGY
ln(wiGY ) = α
full
0 +GiYiα
full
1 +Giα
full
2 + Yiα
full
3 +Xiβ1 +GiXiβ2 + YiXiβ3 +GiYiXiβ4 + 
full
iGY
(4)
5We thus have the index G ∈ {0, 1} and the dummy variable Gi, with
Gi =
{
1 if the index of person i is G = 1
0 if the index of person i is G = 0
For the second group, we have the index Y ∈ {A,B} and the dummy variable Yi, with
Yi =
{
1 if the index of person i is Y = A
0 if the index of person i is Y = B
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where αfull and β are the 4×1 and 4K×1 vectors of coefficients from Xi1 and Xi2, respectively.
The error term is represented by fulliGY .
We can recast the parameters of the full model evaluated at the mean from the pair-wise
regressions of (2):
1. When (the indices) G=1 and Y=A, we get:
• αˆ1A = αˆfull0 + αˆfull1 + αˆfull2 + αˆfull3
• βˆ1A = βˆ1 + βˆ2 + βˆ3 + βˆ4
2. When (the indices) G=0 and Y=A, we get:
• αˆ0A = αˆfull0 + αˆfull3
• βˆ0A = βˆ1 + βˆ3
3. When (the indices) G=1 and Y=B, we get:
• αˆ1B = αˆfull0 + αˆfull2
• βˆ1B = βˆ1 + βˆ2
4. When (the indices) G=0 and Y=B, we get:
• αˆ0B = αˆfull0
• βˆ0B = βˆ1
Re-arranging the terms slightly, gives us:
αˆfull0 = αˆ0B
αˆfull2 = αˆ1B − αˆ0B
αˆfull3 = αˆ0A − αˆ0B
αˆfull1 = αˆ1A − αˆ0B − αˆ1B + αˆ0B − αˆ0A + αˆ0B
= (αˆ0B − αˆ1B)− (αˆ0A − αˆ1A)
βˆ1 = βˆ0B
βˆ2 = βˆ1B − βˆ0B
βˆ3 = βˆ0A − βˆ0B
βˆ4 = βˆ0B − βˆ1B − βˆ0A + βˆ1A
= (βˆ0B − βˆ1B)− (βˆ0A − βˆ1A)
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By estimating the base model and considering the set of regressors Xi2 as omitted variables, we
obtain the following specification:
αˆbase = αˆfull + (X ′i1Xi1)
−1X ′i1Xi2βˆ
full (5)
where
• (X ′i1Xi1)−1X ′i1Xi2βˆfull is the OVB
• The parameter estimates from the base model (3) evaluated at the mean are:
αˆbase =
[
αˆbase0 , αˆ
base
1 , αˆ
base
2 , αˆ
base
3
]T
being a 4× 1 column vector.
• αˆfull is the 4 × 1 column vector containing the coefficient estimates of Xi1 from the full
model (4) evaluated at the mean.
• (X ′i1Xi1)−1X ′i1Xi2 is the linear projection of Xi2 on Xi1, with dimension 4× 4K.
•
βˆfull =
[
βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, βˆ4
]T
is a 4K × 1 column vector of coefficients from the full model (4) evaluated at the mean.
The model specification in equation (5) can be decomposed as follows:
αˆbase = αˆfull + δˆ1 + δˆ2 + δˆ3 + δˆ4 (6)
with δˆ ≡ αˆbase − αˆfull = (X ′i1Xi1)−1X ′i1Xi2βˆfull, where
• δˆq = Γˆqβˆfullq , with Γˆq = (X ′i1Xi1)−1X ′i1Xi2q of dimension kXi1 × kq and Xi2q being
the qth column of Xi2, for q = 1, .., Q. The column vector βˆ
full
q has dimension kq× 1,
thus δˆq is a kXi1 × 1 column vector;
• kXi1 is equal to the number of regressors from Xi1, i.e. 4 in our case (Xi1 has
dimension 1× 4);
• kq is equal to the number of regressors in the qth column of Xi2.
3.2 Decomposition
Recall that we are interested in the estimation and decomposition of the change in the pay gap
between group G across group Y , i.e.6
∆B −∆A =
(
ln(w0B)− ln(w1B)
)
−
(
ln(w0A)− ln(w1A)
)
6For example, the change of the GPG across two years.
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with ∆B being the pay gap by group G given that Y = B and ∆A being the wage gap between
G given that Y = A. From equation (2), we know that:
∆B =
(
ln(w0B)− ln(w1B)
)
= −αˆbase2
∆A =
(
ln(w0A)− ln(w1A)
)
= −αˆbase1 − αˆbase2
and hence αˆ1 represents the difference of the two wage gaps:
∆B −∆A = αˆbase1
Given the definition of αˆbase, we are interested in the second row of αˆbase, i.e. of equation (5), or
αˆbase1 in order to obtain the change of the wage gaps, ∆
B −∆A. Starting from equation (5), we
calculate the second row of the 4×4K matrix (X ′i1Xi1)−1X ′i1Xi2 considering average observable
characteristics:
κ =
[
(x¯0B − x¯1B)− (x¯0A − x¯1A), (x¯1A − x¯1B), (x¯1A − x¯0A), x¯1A
]
with dimension 1× 4K. The second row of equation (5) or the difference of the respective wage
gap evaluated at the mean is thus:
αˆbase1 = αˆ
full
1 + κβˆ
full (7)
and can be re-written as:
αˆ1
base = (αˆ0B − αˆ1B)− (αˆ0A − αˆ1A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
αˆfull1
+ [(x¯0B − x¯1B)− (x¯0A − x¯1A)] βˆ0B︸︷︷︸
βˆ1
+ (x¯1A − x¯1B)(βˆ1B − βˆ0B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βˆ2
+ (x¯1A − x¯0A)(βˆ0A − βˆ0B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βˆ3
+ x¯1A[(βˆ0B − βˆ1B)− (βˆ0A − βˆ1A)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
βˆ4
= ∆B −∆A (8)
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where αˆ1
base and αˆ1
full are scalars and x¯′GY , βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, βˆ4 are K×1 column vectors, respectively.
The above expression can be re-written as a ‘double’ (two-fold) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition:
αˆ1
base = (αˆ0B − αˆ1B) + (x¯0B − x¯1B)βˆ0B + x¯1B(βˆ0B − βˆ1B)
− [(αˆ0A − αˆ1A) + (x¯0A − x¯1A)βˆ0A + x¯1A(βˆ0A − βˆ1A)]
Decomposing the change in the wage gap between group G across group Y in the following way
allows to better understand the elements that contribute to the earnings differences across G
and Y : ∆B −∆A = E + U + I1 + I2, with
E = [(x¯0B − x¯1B)− (x¯0A − x¯1A)]βˆ0B (9)
Here, the same prices, namely the ones of the respective base category, βˆ0B, are assumed.
Thus, E measures the amount of the change of the gap attributable to differences in observed
characteristics. It is the component referred to as differences in quantities, i.e. the explained
part. The unexplained component becomes the following:
U = αˆfull1 + x¯1A[(βˆ0B − βˆ1B)− (βˆ0A − βˆ1A)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
= αˆfull1 + u (10)
U measures the change of differences in the intercepts, αˆfull1 , as well as the change over Y of
the differences in coefficients by G. Characteristics are hold fix at x¯1A. Additionally, we observe
now two interaction terms, I1 and I2, accounting for the fact that differences in characteristics
and parameters exist simultaneously between the four groups. The interaction effects are the
following:
I1 = (x¯1A − x¯1B)(βˆ1B − βˆ0B) (11)
and
I2 = (x¯1A − x¯0A)(βˆ0A − βˆ0B) (12)
I1 accounts for differences in prices by G given changes in the set of endowments across Y .7 I2
catches changes in coefficients over Y given that endowments between G are different.8
7In the case of the GPG over time, I1 catches year-specific effects in endowments given gender-related differ-
ences in prices in the ending period. That is assuming that in the ending period differences in prices between men
and women persist (compared to the starting period), it accounts for changing endowments of women over time.
8In the first case of the empirical application, I2 assumes different endowments between women and men in
the starting period and asks how coefficients change over time given gender differences in quantities.
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Despite using the decomposition approach based on the OVB formula, we can compare
differences in pay gaps by estimating a system of Seemingly Unrelated Equations (SURE). Using
the SURE method allows errors to be correlated across equations and is more efficient. However,
we prefer the more intuitive or more familiar interpretation of the method outlined above.
Furthermore, the model based on the OVB formula catches otherwise unobserved interaction
effects.
3.3 Robustness of the Method Proposed and Problems of the Standard Ap-
proach
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition suffers from various problems. In particular, the method
is not unique and its components may be unstable when different controls are added to the
Mincer-type wage equation. As the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is not unique, the choice
of the non-discriminatory wage structure matters and the results may change according to the
reference category chosen (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom,
1994; Fortin, 2008). Several solutions have been proposed in the literature to solve the so-
called index-number problem. Suggestions in the literature consist in esimating a pooled wage
structure (Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994) or assigning different weights to the
two groups (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988). The intercept-shift approach including the group
indicator and parameter restrictions, re-writes the decomposition in terms of advantages of
men and disadvantages of women (Fortin, 2008). Thereby, the decompostion does no longer
depend on the choice of the non-discriminatory wage structure. In the empirical application in
Section 3.2, we take men and the ending period as base category or non-discriminatory wage
structure.9 Indeed, the standard case of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition assumes positive
discrimination against women, i.e. it takes men as the non-discriminatory wage structure. For
a recent application, see for example Mandel and Semyonov (2014). We can easily change the
reference category by imposing different weights across groups (following Reimers, 1983; Cotton,
1988) and show in Appendix A that the standard case of the GPG can be decomposed in the
sense of the intercept-shift approach as proposed by Fortin (2008) based on the OVB formula.
In the case of a detailed decomposition, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition varies with
the choice of the left-out category of categorical variables included in the estimation. We show
the invariance with respect to categorical variables of the decomposition aproach based on the
OVB formula in Appendix B. The coefficients of the categorical variables are transformed
making them invariant to the choice of the (omitted) base category (Gardeazabal and Ugidos,
2004; Fortin, 2008). Moreover, in Appendix C, we show that the decomposition based on the
intercept-shift approach holds also for our proposed decomposition of pay gaps between groups
G and Y . In Appendix D, we show that the critique of Lee (2015) stating that the intercept-shift
approach relies on second moments, while first moments should be considered, does not apply to
9In the second empirical application, men in the public sector are the non-discriminatory wage structure.
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our proposed decomposition approach with gender dummies along with parameter restrictions.10
We derive the results in the appendices based on the GPG. However, the derived results are not
only valid for the case of the GPG but can be applied to a variety of decomposition problems.
4 Empirical Implementation
In this Section, we consider the change of the GPG over time (case 1) as well as the PPWG
between men and women (case 2). By applying our proposed approach, we are able to draw
inference on the diverse contributors to the GPG over time.11 The results from the standard
model are also shown for the sake of comparison.
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use the 2014 and 2005 cross-sectional files of the survey ISFOL PLUS12 from the Italian In-
stitute for the Development of Vocational Training for Workers (ISFOL). The data was collected
jointly with the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. Special characteristics of the survey
are that it provides broad information on the intervieews’ working profiles and motivation to
work as well as on the demographic and family background of the participants. Data collection
is conducted by Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) and the data set is based
on subjective measures only.
In 2005, the original sample contains 38,940 observations. In the wave 2014, 54,961 indi-
viduals were interviewed. In our analysis, we focus on full-time employees aged 18-64 years.
We include only individuals in the sample that work at least 36 hours per week and exclude
self-employed workers from the analysis. The sample is further restricted to earnings from the
main job only, i.e. from the job that yields the highest income. After dropping observations with
missing data on other variables of interest, our sample contains 9,495 positive wage observations
in 2005 and 8,423 in 2014. For the analysis of the evolution of the GPG over time, we pool
together the two cross sections of 2005 and 2014. For the analysis of the PPWG between men
and women, we use the latest release, i.e. the wave of 2014. In 2005, our sample contains 4,778
women (50.3%) and 4,717 men (49.7%). In the 2014-release, 3,828 (45.4%) individuals are female
and 4,595 (54.6%) are male. In 2014, 1,799 women (52.8% of total public-sector employment)
and 1,607 men (47.2% of total public-sector employment) are occupied in the public sector.
Thus, slightly more women than men are employed in the public sector. The OLS estimates are
based on the natural logarithm of net hourly wages as dependent variable. The data set includes
also a variable for monthly gross earnings. However, 98% of all observations contain missing val-
ues.13 Therefore, we prefer to use the monthly-based net income as dependent variable. Table 1
10That is the model outlined in Appendix C.
11In the second case, we draw inference on the components of the PPWG by gender.
12Participation, Labor, Unemployment Survey (PLUS)
13The survey contains also gross annual earnings. Unfortunately, gross annual earnings divided by the number
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and 2 report mean and standard deviation for some of the variables included in the analysis for
the two cases under consideration, respectively. Detailed information on the variables used in
the analysis can be found in Appendix E.
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics Case 1
Table 1 shows that women have on average higher educational attainment than men and that
their human capital increased from 2005 to 2014 (Schooling). For men, the increase is less
pronounced. Men still outperform women in terms of labor market characteristics (Exper and
Tenure). However, while the average years of experience of women increased over the last decade,
men’s average years of experience decreased slightly. Nonetheless, the average level of labor-
market experience is still higher for men than for women in 2014. On average, men hold more
often an unlimited contract in both years (Contract Type). The proportion of married women
and men reduced slightly over the last decade (Married). The share of individuals employed in
Northern Italy decreased slightly for both men and women (North). In 2014, more females than
males are emplyoed in highly specialized occupations, while for the wave of 2005, the opposite
holds (Manager).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Case 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Women Men
2005 2014 2005 2014
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Exper 16.23 11.33 17.73 12.08 20.51 12.86 20.19 12.95
Tenure 10.42 9.822 13.52 11.46 14.10 11.70 15.41 12.34
Schooling 12.72 2.722 14.30 1.486 12.26 2.842 13.95 1.397
Contract Type 0.838 0.369 0.862 0.345 0.879 0.327 0.884 0.321
Married 0.591 0.492 0.580 0.494 0.580 0.494 0.577 0.494
Italian 0.989 0.103 0.987 0.115 0.994 0.0768 0.993 0.0857
North 0.533 0.499 0.502 0.500 0.463 0.499 0.480 0.500
Centre 0.205 0.404 0.223 0.416 0.183 0.387 0.211 0.408
Manager 0.118 0.323 0.247 0.431 0.136 0.343 0.232 0.422
Intermed Prof 0.617 0.486 0.609 0.488 0.465 0.499 0.499 0.500
Observations 4,778 3,828 4,717 4,595
of months in a calendar year (including a 13th month), differ by more than 800 Euros (per month) from the
reported monthly gross income.
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4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics Case 2
Table 2 shows that the average level of educational attainment is higher in the public compared
to the private sector. Women have on average higher educational attainment than men in both
sectors. Female civil servants are even better educated than their female colleagues in the private
sector. Similarly, men in the public sector have higher educational performance compared to
their male peers in the private sector. Men outperform women in both sectors in terms of labor
market presence and job tenure. About the equal amount of male and female employees is
married, yet, the proportion of married employees is higher in the public sector. In the public
sector, men and women are more often employed in highly specialized jobs. The proportion of
highly specialized females in public employment is higher than that of males.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Case 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Women Men
Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Exper 14.09 10.65 21.83 12.29 17.69 12.57 24.84 12.35
Tenure 9.766 9.442 17.75 12.04 12.57 11.47 20.68 12.18
Schooling 14.13 1.454 14.48 1.500 13.79 1.320 14.26 1.481
Contract Type 0.819 0.385 0.911 0.286 0.859 0.348 0.928 0.258
Married 0.471 0.499 0.703 0.457 0.495 0.500 0.730 0.444
Italian 0.978 0.147 0.997 0.0577 0.991 0.0964 0.996 0.0610
North 0.555 0.497 0.442 0.497 0.553 0.497 0.343 0.475
Centre 0.218 0.413 0.228 0.420 0.210 0.407 0.214 0.410
Manager 0.140 0.347 0.367 0.482 0.180 0.384 0.327 0.469
Intermed Prof 0.646 0.478 0.569 0.495 0.498 0.500 0.502 0.500
Observations 2,029 1,799 2,988 1,607
4.2 Empirical Results
We first present the decomposition results from the standard Oaxaca-Blinder approach and
discuss the conclusions drawn on the change of the wage gap in this framework. Next, we apply
the method derived in Section 3 in order to directly estimate changes of the wage gaps and in
order to draw inference on the diverse contributors to the change of the gap.
4.2.1 The Gender Pay Gap over Time
A general finding in the literature is that the gap in pay by gender was reduced over time (Blau
and Kahn, 2006; Goldin, 2014; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). The part attributable to observed
14
characteristics and therefore referred to as explained component increased, while the unex-
plained part, i.e. the component due to differences in returns to wage-related characteristics
and differences in the intercepts, decreased.
Indeed, by applying the traditional approach to our data, we also find a reduction of the
GPG in hourly wages over time; 12.4% in 2005 and 9.5% in 2014.14 Table 3 shows that the
gaps are highly statistically significant in either case. The composition of the gap also changed
across the decade. In 2005, the explained component does not play a role in determining the
GPG (as it is not statistically significant), while in 2014, the endowments part becomes highly
statistically significant and contributes to a narrowing of the GPG (negative term). Differences
in the unexplained component are statistically significant in both years. The component in 2014
decreased slightly (86.2% in 2005 versus 84.3% in 2014). A relatively small decrease in the
unexplained component of the GPG in 2014 is in line with results of other scholars (e.g. Fortin,
2008; Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). In 2005, differences in endowments and coefficients that
exist simultaneously between men and women, have a statistically significant impact as well,
what is no longer the case in 2014.
All in all, our data delivers results in line with the literature, when applying the standard
estimation methodology. The GPG declined over the last decade, differences in endowments (in
favor of women) have become statistically significant in 2014 and the part of the GPG due to
differences in prices has declined.
14The estimated GPGs in this paper are larger than the pay gaps found by Eurostat (2017). Eurostat (2017)
finds wage gaps amounting to 4.4% in 2006 (missing in 2005) and 6.1% in 2014 for Italy. These relatively larger
gaps are due to our sample restriction of considering only employees working at least 36 hours per week.
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Table 3: Standard Decomposition
of the GPG in 2005 and 2014
(1) (2)
Variables 2005 2014
Differential
ln(wM ) 1.999*** 2.134***
(0.006) (0.007)
ln(wF ) 1.875*** 2.039***
(0.006) (0.007)
Difference 0.124*** 0.095***
(0.008) (0.009)
Decomposition
Endowments 0.008 -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006)
Coefficients 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.008) (0.009)
Interaction 0.009* 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
%–Contribution
Endowments 6.5 12.6
Coefficients 86.2 84.3
Interaction 7.3 3.1
Observations 9,495 8,423
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: For the GPG in 2014, the %–
contribution for the endowments effect is
|0.016|
(|0.016|+0.107+0.004) × 100.
Next, we directly estimate the change of the GPG between 2014 and 2005 and decompose
that change in explained and unexplained components as well as interaction effects. Table 4,
column (1), shows the base model of case 1. The coefficient estimate of femyear shows the change
of the GPG from 2014 to 2005. The difference between the GPG in 2014 and 2005 amounts to
−0.03 log points and is statistically significant. Given the negative sign, the GPG has decreased
over time. The magnitude as well as the sign of the change is also visible by looking at the
aggregate GPGs from the outcome of the standard estimation in Table 3. However, now we
can also conclude that this reduction in the GPG is statistically significant. The full model
is presented in column (2) of Table 4. We immediately see that the part of the price effect
due to differences in the intercepts, αˆfull1 , is not statistically significant. Similarly, the effect of
being a woman or in year 2005, all else equal, becomes statistically insignificant. The remaining
coefficient estimates show the expected signs.15
15The full regression output is shown in Table F.1 in Appendix F.
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Table 4: OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 1, Base and Full Specification
(1) (2)
Basic Specification Full Specification
femyear -0.028** -0.051
(0.012) (0.185)
female -0.095*** -0.148
(0.009) (0.152)
year -0.135*** -0.010
(0.009) (0.130)
Groups of Covariates
Labor Market Presence No Yes
Educational Attainment No Yes
Job Characteristics No Yes
Demographic and Family Background Characteristics No Yes
Industrial and Occupational Dummies No Yes
Interaction Terms No Yes
Observations 17,918 17,918
R-squared 0.050 0.291
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5 presents the results from our proposed decomposition. The results show that the
change of the GPG is only explained by the quantity effect. The change of the GPG over time is
explained by changes in observed characteristics between men and women (in favor of women)
over time. We know from Table 1 that women’s set of observable human capital and labor
market characteristics (Schooling, Exper) is increasing over the last decade, while that of men is
partly even decreasing (Exper) or remained lower than that of women (educational attainment).
In fact, in educational matters, women have outpaced men (Goldin, 2006). The results from the
standard method discussed in Section 4.2.1 suggest that the coefficients part of the GPGs, i.e.
the part due to differences in returns on observable characteristics, was a main contributor to the
GPG in either year with decreasing importance in the ending period. However, by estimating
the difference of the GPG over time directly, we see that this so-called discriminatory part has
not significantly changed over the last ten years in Italy. The decomposition shows that the
only factor that contributes statistically significantly to the narrowing of the gap are better
observable characteristics for women. Hence, the closing of the GPG is not explained by anti-
discrimination laws, changes in attitudes towards women in the labor market or changes in the
family structure and birth control. The latter is, apart from the unexplained part (U), caught
by the interaction effects accounting for simultaneous differences in endowments over time and
changing prices between men and women (I1) as well as variation in the set of endowments by
gender and changing prices over time (I2). The components account for the effects of changes in
institutional settings or attributes towards women on prices (given differences in endowments).
Yet, the effects are not statistically significant.
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Table 5: Decomposition of the Change in the GPG over time – Case 1
(1)
Pooled Sample (2005 and 2014)
Decomposition
E -0.023***
(0.007)
I1 0.002
(0.013)
I2 -0.006
(0.006)
u 0.050
(0.179)
Total = E + I1 + I2 + u 0.023
(0.185)
Observations 17,918
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
4.2.2 The Public-Private Sector Wage Gap between Men and Women
In the literature a positive wage gap between the public and the private sector is found (Melly,
2005; Lucifora and Meurs, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2007; Christofides and Michael, 2013;
Mandel and Semyonov, 2014). Table 6 shows that also in our data for Italy, we find differences
in earnings by sector, with higher wage levels in the public sector. A general result is that
women are better-off in the public compared to the private sector, while for men the public-
sector premia is less important (e.g. Melly, 2005). We find different PPWGs by gender as well;
23.2% for women and 19.8% for men (see Table 6). Both gaps are found to be highly statistically
significant. Also, the composition of the PPWGs differs by gender. For women, the PPWG is
mainly due to the unexplained part (54.3%). On the contrary, for men, the endowments effect is
the main driver of the pay gap (59.9%). Interaction effects are rather small but more important
for the wage gap in the female subsample (15.5% compared to 6.1% in the male subsample).
The decomposition outcome of the PPWG between men and women using our proposed
model is provided in Tables 7–8. The results from the base model suggest that there is a
positive and statistically significant difference in the PPWG between men and women equal to
−0.03 log points.16 The dummy variable for working in the private sector (private) negative
and significant, tells us that there is a wage loss for working in the private sector compared to
public-sector employment. As expected, the coefficient on the female-dummy shows that being
a women has a significant and negative impact on labor income. In the full model, the effect of
private-sector employment as well as being female on wages turns statistically insignificant. Yet,
the interaction term fempriv, is statistically significant and strongly negative (−0.72). Hence,
αˆfull1 , i.e. the part of the price or unexplained effect due to differences in the starting points
is statistically significant. This implies that there is a premia for simply working in the public
sector and that this premia is higher for women than for men. Again, the remaining parameter
16Indicated by the interaction of the dummies female and private; fempriv.
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Table 6: Standard Decomposition of the PPWG for Women and Men in 2014
(1) (2)
Women Men
Differential
ln(wPublic Sector) 2.162*** 2.263***
(0.009) (0.011)
ln(wPrivate Sector) 1.930*** 2.065***
(0.010) (0.008)
Difference 0.232*** 0.198***
(0.013) (0.013)
Decomposition
Endowments 0.070*** 0.118***
(0.015) (0.015)
Coefficients 0.126*** 0.067***
(0.016) (0.024)
Interaction 0.036** 0.012
(0.018) (0.023)
%–Contribution
Endowments 30.2 59.9
Coefficients 54.3 34.0
Interaction 15.5 6.1
Observations 3,828 4,595
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
estimates impact on wages as expected.17
By looking at the decomposition, we find that the difference in observable characteristics
across sectors and gender, E, does play a statistically significant role in explaining the differ-
ence of the PPWG between men and women. In particular, the explained component drives
the negative PPWG by gender as best-educated females are more often located in the public
sector (Bordogna, 2012; Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso, 2015). The difference in the unexplained
component, u, of the PPWG between men and women is significant as well and shows that
the change works towards a positive PPWG between men and women. This implies that more
egalitarian pay schemes in the public sector are ruled out by female discrimination in prices in
both sectors. Moreover, we observe simultaneously differences in characteristics between women
and men as well as difference in coefficients between the private and the public sector (for men;
I1). Hence, more favorable endowments of men in the private sector compared to women in the
private sector and higher pay schemes in the public sector narrow the (negative) PPWG between
men and women. All in all, for case 2, the conclusions drawn from the standard estimation are
confirmed; both quantity and price effects contribute to the difference in the PPWG between
men and women. Yet, we gain the additional insight that the set-up or organization of the
public sector does play a role as well. That is institutional norms of the public sector being
relatively more gender-equal in combination with more discriminatory practices against women
in the private sector lead to an increase of the significant difference in the PPWG between men
17The complete regression outcome of the full model is shown in Table F.2 in Appendix F.
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and women in 2014 in Italy.
Table 7: OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 2, Base and Full Specification
(1) (2)
Basic Sepcification Full Specification
fempriv -0.034* -0.724**
(0.019) (0.289)
female -0.101*** 0.278
(0.014) (0.196)
private -0.198*** 0.309
(0.013) (0.205)
Groups of Covariates
Labor Market Presence No Yes
Educational Attainment No Yes
Job Characteristics No Yes
Demographic and Family Background Characteristics No Yes
Industrial and Occupational Dummies No Yes
Interaction Terms No Yes
Observations 8,423 8,423
R-squared 0.069 0.236
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 8: Decomposition of the Change in the PPWG by Gender – Case 2
(1)
Pooled Sample (Women and Men)
Decomposition
E -0.028***
(0.011)
I1 0.041*
(0.022)
I2 0.002
(0.011)
u 0.675*
(0.357)
Total = E + I1 + I2 + u 0.689*
(0.360)
Observations 8,423
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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5 Conclusion
Adding to the discussion of the convergence of the GPG over time and the persistence of a
PPWG between men and women, we propose an alternative decomposition method allowing to
draw inference on the difference of two wage gaps on aggregate as well as on its components.
The model set-up bases on the OVB formula and the Gelbach decomposition. Despite additional
insights on the composition of differences in gaps, the method can be made robust to the choice
of the reference category (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom,
1994; Fortin, 2008) as well as to the indeterminacy problem (Lee, 2015). The method proposed
can be applied to a variety of cases such as differences in the GPG and its drivers over time,
across countries, sectors, occupations or unions. We empirically consider two cases; the change
of the GPG over time as well as the PPWG between men and women in Italy.
The observed closing of the GPG over time is heavily discussed in the literature and the
determination of the reasons of the narrowing is of huge interest, especially with regard to
policy implications (Blau and Kahn, 2006; Goldin, 2014; Blau and Kahn, 2016). Similarly, the
PPWG that is found to differ for men and women is a topic of on-going research (Melly, 2005).
Yet, up to know, in the standard estimation framework, direct inference on the difference of pay
gaps and changes in their components could not be drawn. Conclusions were rather drawn by
estimating the pay gaps separately in different subsamples and comparing the results ex post.
In this way, it is not possible to test the significance of the change in the estimated pay gaps
on aggregate or the components of the decomposition. Besides the estimation of the change
of the GPG over time on aggregate as well as of the explained and unexplained component,
our method also catches otherwise unobserved interaction effects across the respective groups of
interest.
We find a significant convergence of the GPG over the last decade in Italy. The convergence
of the GPG over time was found to be only explained by a reduction in differences in observable
characteristics by gender. On the contrary, by estimating the GPG separately for 2005 and 2014,
i.e. following the standard approach in the literature, the relative decline in the contribution of
the price component to the wage gap might have led to the conclusion that the implementation
of anti-discrimination laws and changing attitudes towards women in the labor market have
influenced the narrowing of the pay gap over time as well. Yet, these policies as well as changes
in social norms seem to have been less effective than expected a priori. Thereby, we add to the
literature on the covergence of the GPG over time for the case of Italy the finding that the closing
of the pay differential by gender over the last decade was entirely explained by the catching-up
of women in terms of endowments. The results for the second case we have examined, i.e. the
PPWG between men and women, point the attention to differences in the structure of the public
and private sector, which are found to be important to explain the differential. Better educated
females are more often employed in the public sector given more egalitarian pay schemes as
well as job stability (Bordogna, 2012; Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso, 2015). In this case, the
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results derived from the standard approach concerning the explained and unexplained part are
confirmed in the sense that both components contribute significantly to the change of the PPWG
between men and women.
All in all, the analysis with the proposed decomposition method offers a better understanding
of what has led to the narrowing of the GPG in the last ten years and what drives the difference in
the PPWG between men and women. Most importantly, we can infer what drives the difference
in the respective pay gaps in a statistically significant manner. The model proposed offers an
intuitive approach to directly estimate changes in wage gaps between groups and can be applied
to various problems.
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Appendix
The robustness of the decompostion is for simplicity shown for the case of the GPG. Deriving
the robust model based on the GPG allows also for a better comparison of the method with
the approaches in the literature (e.g. Fortin, 2008, uses the case of the GPG).18 In Appendix C,
when considering differences of gaps, we derive the model for the GPG changing over time.
Notably, the methods can be applied to various other decomposition problems.
A Solving the Index-Number Problem of Decompositions using
the Intercept-Shift Approach
As is well known in the literature, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is not unique. Therefore,
the choice of the non-discriminatory wage structure (men or women) matters and leads to
different results (Cotton, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). Several approaches have been
proposed to circumvent this problem (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca
and Ransom, 1994; Fortin, 2008). We extend the method proposed by Gelbach (2016) in order
to have a wage decomposition invariant to the reference category adopted. In particular, we
adopt the decomposition proposed by Fortin (2008) that includes gender intercept shifts along
with an identification restriction in the regression of females and males pooled together, when
considering the standard case of the GPG for individual i:
ln(wi) = γ0 + γ0FFi + γ0MMi +Xiγ + i
subject to:
γ0F + γ0M = 0
where Fi is equal to one if the individual is female and zero otherwise and Mi equals one if
the individual is male and zero otherwise, i.e. Fi = (1 −Mi). Correspondingly, the index F
identifies women and the index M identifies men. For the pooled regression with male and
female dummies, respectively, evaluated at the mean, we have:
ln(wM ) = γˆ0 + γˆ0MM + X¯M γˆ
ln(wF ) = γˆ0 + γˆ0FF + X¯F γˆ
The identification restriction imposes that the pooled wage equation truly represents a non-
discriminatory wage structure, i.e. a wage structure, where the advantage of men is equal to the
18The derived model is robust to the index-number problem and invariant with respect to categorical variables
as well as robust to the indeterminacy problem.
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disadvantage of women:
ln(wM )− ln(wF ) = (X¯M − X¯F )γˆ + (γˆ0M − γˆ0F )
The first component on the right-hand side, (X¯M − X¯F )γˆ, is the explained part, while γˆ0M
and γˆ0F are the advantage of men and the disadvantage of women, respectively. In particular,
from the difference of the wage regression separately for men and women and the pooled wage
regression with a gender dummy, we have:
γˆ0M = X¯M (βˆM − γˆ) + (βˆ0M − γˆ0) advantage of men
γˆ0F = X¯F (βˆF − γˆ) + (βˆ0F − γˆ0) disadvantage of women
where βˆ0M , βˆ0F are the intercepts and βˆM , βˆF are the estimated coefficients of wage equations
estimated separately for men and women:
ln(wiM ) = β0M +XiMβM + iM (A.1)
ln(wiF ) = β0F +XiFβF + iF (A.2)
In order to adopt the above wage decomposition within the conditional decomposition frame-
work proposed by Gelbach (2016), we estimate the following wage equation:
ln(wi) = γ0 + γ0FFi + γ0MMi +Xiγ +XiFiγXF +XiMiγXM + νi (A.3)
subject to:
γ0F + γ0M = 0
γXkF + γXkM = 0 for k = 1 . . .K
where γXkF and γXkM are the parameters of the interaction term between the kth regressor Xi
and the dummy Fi and Mi, respectively. The error term is represented by vi. Then,
ln(wM ) = γˆ0 + γˆ0M + X¯M γˆ + X¯M γˆXM
ln(wF ) = γˆ0 + γˆ0F + X¯F γˆ + X¯F γˆXF
Consequently, the GPG becomes:
ln(wM )− ln(wF ) = (γˆ0M − γˆ0F ) + (X¯M − X¯F )γˆ + X¯M γˆXM − X¯F γˆXF
= −2γˆ0F + (X¯M − X¯F )γˆ − (X¯M + X¯F )γˆXF (A.4)
First, we observe that it can be easily shown that there exists the following relationship between
the parameter estimates of equations (A.2)-(A.1) and (A.3):
27
γˆ + γˆXF = βˆF
γˆ0 + γˆ0F = βˆ0F
γˆ − γˆXF = βˆM
γˆ0 − γˆ0F = βˆ0M
Therefore, the GPG of (A.4) can be re-written in terms of the Fortin decomposition as:
ln(wM )− ln(wF ) = (βˆ0M − γˆ0)− (βˆ0F − γˆ0) + (X¯M − X¯F )γˆ + X¯M (βˆM − γˆ)− X¯F (βˆF − γˆ)
= (X¯M − X¯F )γˆ + [X¯M (βˆM − γˆ) + (βˆ0M − γˆ0)]− [X¯F (βˆF − γˆ) + (βˆ0F − γˆ0)]
(A.5)
Second, the estimation can be recast in terms of the sequential decomposition of Gelbach by
considering the following base model for individual i:
ln(wi) = γ
base
0 + (Fi −Mi)γbase0F + basei (A.6)
where the 1× 2 vector of regressors Xi1 of the base specification contains for each obseravation
i a constant and the difference between the two dummy variables Fi and Mi, (Fi −Mi). The
full model is defined as follows:
ln(wi) = γ
full
0 + (Fi −Mi)γfull0F +Xiγ + (Fi −Mi)XiγXF + fulli (A.7)
where the regressors Xi as well as the interaction between Xi and the difference between the
two dummy variables Fi and Mi are contained in the 1× 2K vector Xi2. The regressors in Xi2
are the omitted variables. By the OVB formula the following relationship holds:[
γˆbase0
γˆbase0F
]
=
[
γˆfull0
γˆfull0F
]
+ (X
′
i1Xi1)
−1X
′
i1Xi2
[
γˆ
γˆXF
]
(A.8)
where
[
γˆbase0 , γˆ
base
0F
]T
is the 2× 1 vector of coefficient estimates of X1 from the base model (A.6)
evaluated at the mean;
[
γˆfull0 , γˆ
full
0F
]T
is the 2× 1 vector containing the coefficient estimates of
Xi1 from the full model (A.7) evaluated at the mean and
[
γˆ, γˆXF
]T
is the vector of coefficients
estimates of Xi2 from the full model (A.7) at the mean, i.e. γˆ
full with dimension 2K × 1. First
observe that γˆbase0F is equal to
ln(wF )−ln(wM )
2 and that γˆ
full
0F is equal to
βˆ0F−βˆ0M
2 . As in Section 3,
we are interested in the second row of equation (A.8). Given the relationship in (A.8), we observe
that:
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γˆbase0F = −
ln(wM )− ln(wF )
2
= −∆
2
= γˆfull0F + ηγˆ
full (A.9)
where ∆ is the GPG and η =
[
(x¯F−x¯M )
2 ,
(x¯F+x¯M )
2
]
contains the sample means of obervable
characteristics in Xi obtained from the linear projection of Xi and (Fi −Mi)Xi with respect
to Xi1. The row vector η has dimension 1 × 2K. Moreover, we have γˆfull0F = βˆ0F−βˆ0M2 =
(βˆ0F−γˆfull0 )−(βˆ0M−γˆfull0 )
2 . Consequently, the GPG can be written as:
−2γbase0F = −2γfull0F + (x¯M − x¯F )γ − (x¯M − x¯F )γXF (A.10)
what completes the proof of decomposition equivalence.
B Invariance Decomposition with respect to Categorical Vari-
ables
A second type of identification issue arises when dummy variables are considered in a detailed
wage decomposition. Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) show that the assignment of the explained
part of the GPG to specific variables is not invariant to the choice of reference groups. This
problem can be easily solved by imposing the following parameter restrictions as proposed by
Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004), Yun (2005) and Fortin (2008):
Ck∑
j=1
γjk = 0, k ∈ C (B.1)
where C denotes the set of categorical variables, and Ck the number of categories for variable k.
The neutral, i.e. non-sensitive to any left-out category, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition follows.
The zero-sum restriction (B.1) is applied to the wage equation, when female and male wages
are estimated separately as well as to the pooled regression with gender dummies. The latter is
additionally estimated with the identification restriction γ0M+γ0F = 0 on the gender parameters.
Thereby, the intercepts, β0M , β0F and γ0, are no longer influenced by the choice of the reference
category in the case of categorical variables.
The restriction (B.1) can also be applied to the method proposed in Section 3 leading to indi-
cator variables that are invariant to the choice of the left-out category in the case of categorical
variables.
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C Estimating Differences of Gaps with the Intercept-Shift Ap-
proach
The extension of the decomposition described in Appendix A to the case of the estimation of
the difference of wage gaps follows straightforward. We consider, as in Section 3.2, the indicator
variable Yi that takes values {0, 1}. Again, when the indicator variable Yi is used as an index
(Y ), Yi = 0 corresponds to B and Yi = 1 to A. Similarly, in order to circumvent confusion
with the intercept (referred to as β0 in coherence with Appendix A), the gender index is not
numerical here, but G ∈ {F,M} with F = female and M = male replacing the numerical
index {1, 0}, respectively. The set of regressors considered in Section 3.2 are hence transformed
as follows:
Xi1 = [1, (Fi −Mi)Yi, (Fi −Mi), Yi]
Xi2 = [X, (Fi −Mi)Xi, YiXi, (Fi −Mi)YiXi]
for each individual i, with Xi1 having dimension 1 × 4 and Xi2 having dimension 1 × 4K. Xi1
contains the interaction of (Fi −Mi) with Yi; (Fi −Mi)Yi. The second set of regressors, Xi2
contains the 1 ×K vector of characteristics Xi as well as the interaction of Xi with (Fi −Mi)
and Yi; (Fi −Mi)Xi, YiXi and (Fi −Mi)YiXi, respectively. The base model is then:
ln(wi) = γ
base
0 + (Fi −Mi)YiγbaseFY + (Fi −Mi)γbaseF + YiγbaseY + basei (C.1)
while the full model is defined as follows:
ln(wi) = γ
full
0 + (Fi −Mi)YiγfullFiYi + (Fi −Mi)γ
full
F + Yiγ
full
Y
+Xiγ + (Fi −Mi)XiγXF + YiXiγXY + (Fi −Mi)YiXiγXY F + fulli (C.2)
where γbase0 is the constant and γ
base
FY , γ
base
F , γ
base
Y are the coefficients of the the base model (C.1),
γfull0 , γ
full
FY , γ
full
F , γ
full
Y are the corresponding constant and coefficients ofXi1 from the full model (C.2).
γ, γXF , γXY , γXY F are the K×1 coefficient vectors of Xi2 from the full model (C.2). The second
row of the linear projection of Xi2 with respect to Xi1 is contained in the following 1×4K vector:
ζ =
[
(x¯0A−x¯1A)−(x¯0B−x¯1B)
2 ,
(x¯0A+x¯1A)−(x¯0B+x¯1B)
2 ,
(x¯1A−x¯0A)
2 ,
(x¯1A+x¯0A)
2
]
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Consider the equivalence between the following parameter estimates evaluated at the mean:
γˆfull0 − γˆfullFY − γˆfullF + γˆfullY = βˆ0,MA
γˆfull0 + γˆ
full
FY + γˆ
full
F + γ
full
Y = βˆ0,FA
γˆfull0 + γˆ
full
F = βˆ0,FB
γˆfull0 − γˆfullF = βˆ0,MB
γˆ + γˆXF + γˆXY + γˆXY F = βˆFA
γˆ − γˆXF + γˆXY − γˆXY F = βˆMA
γˆ + γˆXF = βˆFB
γˆ − γˆXF = βˆMB
Observe that γˆbaseFY is equal to
∆GPG
2 and γˆ
full
FY is equal to
(βˆ0,MB−βˆ0,FB)−(βˆ0,MA−βˆ0,FA)
2 . Given
the fact that
γˆbaseFY =
(
ln(wMB)− ln(wFB)
)
−
(
ln(wMA)− ln(wFA)
)
2
=
∆GPG
2
The relationship:
γˆbaseFY = γˆ
full
FY + ζγˆ
full
can be re-written in terms of the ∆GPG as:
2γˆbaseFY = ∆GPG =
= [(βˆ0,MB − βˆ0,FB)− (βˆ0,MA − βˆ0,FA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
γˆfullFY
+ (∆x¯B −∆x¯A)γˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
+ (
∑
x¯A −
∑
x¯B)γˆXF︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω
−∆x¯AγˆXY︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
+
∑
x¯AγˆXY F︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υ
where ∆x¯Y is the difference between the average level of observed characteristics of men and
women in a certain year, with Y ∈ {A,B} and ∑ x¯Y represents the sum of observable labor
market characteristics present for men and women in Y . Recall that the model can be re-written
in terms of the OVB formula as follows:
2γˆbaseFY = γˆ
full
FY + δˆ
Λ + δˆΩ + δˆΘ + δˆΥ
Pˆ + Qˆ = γˆfullFY + δˆ
Λ + δˆΩ + δˆΘ + δˆΥ
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with P accounting for the price effect and Q for the quantity effect. In particular,
Pˆ = γˆfullFY + Υ
Qˆ = Ω + Θ︸︷︷︸
Y -specific term
+ Λ︸︷︷︸
gender-specific term
γˆfullFY represents the change in the disadvantage of women over time. Thereby, accounting for the
relative improvement (or deterioration) of women’s position in the labor market. Λ measures the
amount of the pay difference attributable to differences in observable characteristics assuming
the same prices over time and gender. Ω accounts for differences in human capital and other
observable labor market characteristics in the economy over time. The underlying prices are the
coefficient estimates obtained when holding Fi fixed at 1 given Xi. Equivalently, the prices could
be expressed as the coefficient estimates obtained when holding Fi fixed at 0 given Xi thanks
to the constraint imposed: γXF = −γXM . Θ accounts for differences in endowments by gender
holding the second indicator variable fixed, i.e. setting the index Y = A. The component Υ can
be re-written as:
Υ = [
∑
x¯AγˆXY F ]
= [x¯1AγˆXY F + x¯0A(−γˆXYM )]
= x¯FAγˆXY F︸ ︷︷ ︸
disadvantage of women
− x¯MAγˆXYM︸ ︷︷ ︸
advantage of men
For the component Υ, the underlying set of characteristics are the average male and female
endowments observed in Y = A, respectively. The prices can be expressed in terms of men’s
advantage or women’s disadvantage given Xi.
Again, the pooled wage equation including the gender parameters and the male and female
earnings equations are estimated separately using additional constraints for each categorical
variable, i.e. under the zero-sum constraint (B.1).
D Intercept-Shift Approach versus Pooled-Sample Approach
Lee (2015) shows that the intercept-shift approach proposed by Fortin (2008) presents two
drawbacks. Firstly, the reference parameter for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, i.e. the
parameter that would prevail in a ‘fair’ world under no discrimination, relies on the variance
difference among categories. Secondly, the reference intercept is arbitrary: the same Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition holds with vastly different reference intercepts.
However, it can be easily shown that our proposed decomposition does not suffer from any of
these aspects. Our decomposition arises from a specification that allows different intercepts and
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slopes. In addition, the constraints imposed on the parameters that identify the counterfactual
reference parameters are the parameters such that the advantage of men is equal to the disad-
vantage of women. In fact, in our model the slope that would prevail under no discrimination,
γ, is the sample average of the group slopes; β0M and β0F :
γ = 0.5β0M + 0.5β0F
i.e. it is equivalent to considering the weights proposed by Reimers (1983).19 Moreover, the
constraint:
β0F − γ0F = β0M + γ0F
prevents the indeterminacy problem shown by Lee (2015). It turns out, that in our model,
the intercept indeterminacy problem highlighted by Lee (2015) is ruled out by imposing the
constraint that the advantage of men should be equal to the disadvantage of women.
19See also Lee (2015).
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E Definition of Variables
Table E.1: Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Lhwage Natural logarithm of net hourly wages
Hourly wages in Euros, net of taxes and social security contributions
Independent Variable
Group Dummies and Interaction Terms
female One if the individual is a woman, zero otherwise
year One if year is 2005, zero otherwise
private One if individual is employed in the private sector
femyear Interactive effect of year and female, i.e. one if employee
is observed in 2005 and is female, zero otherwise
fempriv Interactive effect of private and female, i.e. one if employee
is employed in the private sector and is female, zero otherwise
Inter female X Interactive effect of female and the set of regresors X;
Inter female Exper–Inter female Intermed Prof
Inter year X Interactive effect of year and the set of regresors X;
Inter year Exper–Inter year Intermed Prof
Inter femyear X Interactive effect of femyear and the set of regresors X;
Inter femyear Exper–Inter femyear Intermed Prof
Inter private X Interactive effect of private and the set of regresors X;
Inter private Exper–Inter private Intermed Prof
Inter fempriv X Interactive effect of fempriv and the set of regresors X;
Inter fempriv Exper–Inter fempriv Intermed Prof
Labor Market Presence
Exper Number of years of prior work experience
Exper2 Exper squared
Tenure Number of years worked for current employer
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Educational Attainment
Schooling Number of years of schooling completed
Job Characteristics
Work Climate Individual’s level of statisfaction with the working climate at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0, 4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work Stab Individual’s level of statisfaction with the stability of the individual’s
current job ∈ (0, 4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work Time Individual’s level of statisfaction with the working time at the individual’s
current job, where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work Task Individual’s level of statisfaction with the tasks at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0, 4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Contract Type One if the individual holds an unlimited contract, zero otherwise
Demographic Background
Italian One if individual is Italian, zero otherwise
Homeowner One if individual owns a house (including houses financed by bank loans),
zero otherwise
North One if the individual lives and works in the North of Italy, zero otherwise
Centre One if the individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy, zero otherwise
Family Background
Married One if individual is married, zero otherwise
Educ Moth Uni One if mother’s education is equal to Laurea,
i.e. mother holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Educ Fath Uni One if father’s education is equal to Laurea,
i.e. father holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Industry and Occupations
Sec Ind One if individual is engaged in the industrial sector, zero otherwise
Sec Tour One if individual is engaged in tourism, zero otherwise
Sec Trans One if individual is engaged in transport, zero otherwise
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Sec Comm One if individual is engaged in communication, zero otherwise
Sec Fina One if individual is engaged in financial sector, zero otherwise
Sec Serv One if individual is engaged in firm services, zero otherwise
Sec PA One if individual is engaged in the public administration, zero otherwise
Sec Heal One if individual is engaged in health, zero otherwise
Sec Prof One if individual is engaged in science and other professional activities, zero otherwise
Manager One if individual executes intellectual professions;
scientific and highly specialized occupations, zero otherwise
Intermediate Prof One if individual executes intermediary positions in commercial, technical
or administrative sectors, health services and technicians, zero otherwise
F Regression Output from the Full Specification
Table F.1: OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 1, Full Specification
(1)
Variables
femyear -0.051
(0.185)
female -0.148
(0.152)
year -0.010
(0.130)
Exper 0.019***
(0.002)
Exper2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Tenure 0.004***
(0.001)
Schooling 0.038***
(0.005)
Contract Type 0.080***
(0.023)
Work Climate 0.001
(0.008)
Work Time 0.009
(0.007)
Work Task -0.002
(0.008)
Work Stab -0.024***
(0.007)
North 0.060***
(0.014)
Centre 0.038**
(0.015)
Italian 0.004
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(0.065)
Homeowner -0.006
(0.018)
Married 0.062***
(0.014)
Educ Moth Uni -0.011
(0.033)
Educ Fath Uni 0.069***
(0.027)
Manager 0.136***
(0.020)
Intermed Prof 0.035***
(0.013)
Constant 1.163***
(0.110)
Industrial Dummies Yes
Interaction Terms Yes
Observations 17,918
R-squared 0.291
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table F.2: OLS Estimates of Log Hourly Wages – Case 2, Full Specification
(1)
Variables
fempriv -0.724**
(0.289)
female 0.278
(0.196)
private 0.309
(0.205)
Exper 0.019***
(0.004)
Exper2 -0.000***
(0.000)
Tenure 0.002
(0.001)
Schooling 0.055***
(0.007)
Contract Type 0.182***
(0.057)
Work Climate 0.014
(0.012)
Work Time -0.001
(0.013)
Work Task -0.004
(0.014)
Work Stab -0.017
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(0.013)
North 0.049**
(0.023)
Centre 0.072***
(0.023)
Italian -0.177***
(0.063)
Homeowner 0.050
(0.032)
Married 0.031
(0.026)
Educ Moth Uni 0.074
(0.058)
Educ Fath Uni 0.043
(0.046)
Manager 0.118***
(0.032)
Intermed Prof -0.015
(0.024)
Constant 1.046***
(0.147)
Industrial Dummies Yes
Interaction Terms Yes
Observations 8,423
R-squared 0.236
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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